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Abstract
Th e majority of the world’s refugees have secured a legal 
status without resort to an individual examination of their 
claims. Th e practice of “group” determination, particularly 
in Africa, is interesting in several aspects, not least in that 
it allows a real-time assessment of a need for international 
protection. While these positive aspects should not be lost as 
many jurisdictions in the developing world are equipping 
themselves with individual asylum procedures, it is equally 
important to clarify, and hopefully to harmonize, the pro-
cedural and evidentiary standards applicable to group de-
termination.
How presumptions operate—including their rebuttal or 
removal—is a question worth examining, and not only with 
regard to refugee status determination (RSD) in mass in-
fl ux situations. Legal presumptions and other evidentiary 
shortcuts have also been introduced into individual RSD 
procedures in industrialized states. Th ese include mechan-
isms that are highly problematic from a protection point of 
view, such as the “safe country of origin” presumption of a 
“manifestly unfounded” claim. However, administrative 
bodies and courts have also, from time to time, used some 
form of prima facie admission of evidence in order to lighten 
the burden of asylum applicants, while speeding up the RSD 
process.
Furthermore, this article argues that extralegal pre-
sumptions, based on implicit value judgments about na-
tional or subnational groups, almost invariably colour the 
interviewing and decision-making processes in individual 
cases. Th is fi nding makes it all the more necessary : to (i) 
to  re-assess the signifi cance of “risk-group affi  liation” as an 
element of the refugee defi nition; and (ii) formally recognize 
the role of evidentiary shortcuts in RSD, and recommend 
appropriate standards for their operation.
Résumé
La majorité des réfugiés du monde ont obtenu un statut légal 
sans examen individuel de leurs revendications. La pratique 
de la détermination collective de la qualité de réfugié, par-
ticulièrement en Afrique, est intéressante par plusieurs as-
pects, non des moindres étant qu’elle permet une évaluation 
« en temps réel » du besoin de la protection internationale. 
Bien qu’il soit important de ne pas perdre de vue ces aspects 
positifs — alors que beaucoup de juridictions dans les pays 
en voie de développement adoptent des procédures de déter-
mination du droit d’asile au niveau individuel — il est égale-
ment important d’éclaircir, et aussi peut-être d’harmoniser, 
les normes en matière de procédures et en matière d’élément 
de preuve applicables à la  détermination collective.
Comment fonctionnent les présomptions — y compris 
leur réfutation — est une question qui vaut la peine d’être 
étudiée de plus près, et cela pas seulement dans le contexte 
de la Détermination du statut de réfugié (DSR) dans des 
situations de mouvement collectif. La présomption légale et 
les raccourcis en matière de règles de preuve ont aussi été 
introduits dans des procédures de DSR individuel dans les 
pays industrialisés. Parmi, on retrouve certains mécanismes 
qui posent problème d’un point de vue  de la protection, tel 
la présomption de « revendication manifestement non fon-
dée » dans des cas de « pays sans risque ». D’autre part, des 
entités administratives et des tribunaux ont aussi, de temps 
à autre, fait usage d’une forme quelconque d’admission de 
preuve prima facie dans le but d’alléger le fardeau des de-
mandeurs d’asile tout en donnant un coup d’accélération au 
processus de DSR.
En outre, cet article fait valoir que les présomptions ex-
trajudiciaires fondées sur des jugements de valeur implicites 
concernant des groupes nationaux et sous-nationaux, exer-
cent presque à tout coup un eff et pervers sur les processus 
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d’interview et de prise de décision dans les cas individuels. 
Cette conclusion rend encore plus impératif le besoin de : (i) 
réévaluer la signifi cation d’ « affi  liation à des groupes à ris-
que » en tant qu’élément dans la défi nition du réfugié; et (ii) 
reconnaître formellement le rôle que jouent les raccourcis en 
matière de règles de preuve dans la DSR et recommander 
des normes appropriées pour leur utilisation.
Introduction
Th is article is about determination of refugee status on a group 
basis. More specifi cally, I explore how refugee status deter-
mination (RSD) processes take group characteristics into ac-
count for the distribution of the burden of proof between the 
individual asylum seeker and the state from which protection 
is sought. For the sake of conciseness I focus on fi rst-instance 
decision making, and I make no distinction between those 
procedures within which an oral hearing is an integral part 
of decision making and those within which the processes of 
interview and adjudication are clearly separated.
Group-based determination of refugee status is usually as-
sociated with instances of large-scale infl ux of asylum seek-
ers from a same country or cluster of countries. Th e most au-
thoritative reference on the subject is to be found in UNHCR’s 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status,1 and this is, therefore, where my inquiry will start. 
Paragraph 44 of the Handbook reads as follows:
While refugee status must normally be determined on an indi-
vidual basis, situations have also arisen in which entire groups 
have been under circumstances indicating that members of the 
group could be considered individually as refugees. In such situ-
ations, the need to provide assistance is extremely urgent and it 
may not be possible for purely practical reasons to carry out in-
dividual determination of refugee status for each member of the 
group. Recourse has therefore been had to the so-called “group 
determination” of refugee status, whereby each member of the 
group is regarded prima facie (i.e. in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary) as a refugee.
A critical reading of this text gives rise to a couple of 
issues. First, it is not immediately clear where a “norm” is 
to be found, according to which refugee status must be de-
termined on an individual basis; nor what this “individual 
basis” actually covers. While it is beyond the scope of this 
article to consider the broader implications of this norma-
tive statement, some of these will inevitably surface during 
the course of my inquiry. At this stage, however, I would like 
to focus on another problematic aspect of the above-quoted 
paragraph from the Handbook, which seems to have escaped 
the attention of most commentators.
Whereas the second sentence of this paragraph appears to 
encapsulate the logic of the whole, it is in eff ect dispensable—
in other words, the entire paragraph still makes perfect sense 
if one jumps over the second sentence and connects the third 
sentence immediately with the fi rst one. Th is is because the 
text actually confl ates two distinct and diff erent (albeit pos-
sibly overlapping) scenarios, in only one of which the size of 
the infl ux matters.
Th ere can be no question that a large-scale infl ux of asy-
lum seekers may trigger an emergency in host countries, i.e. 
it is capable of overwhelming the processing resources of 
these countries to the point where, as the Handbook puts it, 
it is no longer possible to carry out individual examination 
of refugee claims. However, does this scenario exhaust the 
mentioned “circumstances indicating that members of the 
group could be considered individually as refugees”?
Certainly not, in my view. Such circumstances can be 
found, within or without a mass infl ux scenario, wherever a 
clearly identifi able segment of the population of a country is 
patently and systematically persecuted, and any number of 
the persecuted group’s members seek protection across the 
border. In this scenario, the rationale for group determina-
tion is not that individual screening is not possible—instead, 
it is that such detailed screening is not necessary.
Of course, there have been and will be situations in which 
resort to group-based determination is both a matter of ef-
fi ciency and the result of an objective analysis of the causes 
of the fl ow. Nonetheless, the distinction between not possible 
and not necessary remains essential, because it makes clear 
that group-based determination is not a mechanism reserved 
for mass infl ux situations. To the contrary, my contention is 
that a measure of group-based determination is inherent in 
any process applying the refugee defi nition to individual asy-
lum seekers, regardless of their numbers.
Let it be clear that I am referring here to the refugee defi n-
ition contained in Article 1 A(2) of the Refugee Convention, 
as amended by the 1967 Protocol. Some commentators have 
asserted that the extensive use of group-based determina-
tion by African states is a corollary to the “expanded” refu-
gee defi nition in the 1969 OAU Convention, and that this 
instrument is the main source and authority for prima facie 
recognition of refugee status.2 As we have noted elsewhere, 
this erroneous construction has been readily exploited by 
European policy makers, always keen to stress regional dif-
ferences if these can back an argument in favour of a dubious 
“protection in the region” doctrine.3
Refugee grounds such as “events seriously disturbing pub-
lic order in either part or the whole”4 of the country of origin 
may indeed evoke the threat of massive displacement. But 
so may persecution on ethnic or religious grounds. In any 
event, as explained above, the notion of “group” in RSD does 
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not only (nor even mainly) refer to the size of the asylum-
seeking caseload, but indeed to the very motivation of their 
fl ight.
It does not take a legal expert to notice that the Convention 
refugee defi nition is intended to protect persons who fear 
persecution because of their membership in a group. Four of 
the fi ve grounds stipulated by Article 1A(2)—race, religion, 
nationality, and particular social group—cannot be con-
strued as anything but “groups.” As for “political opinion,” 
while indeed it can theoretically be held by a sole individual 
or a few isolated persons, it is not likely to attract persecution 
unless it is prevalent among—or imputed to—a sizable sec-
tion of the population of the country of origin.5
To assert that the refugee criteria in the Refugee 
Convention are “highly individualistic”6 is, therefore, an in-
correct reading of the refugee defi nition. Th e plain language 
of Article 1A(2) supports the interpretation which, as early 
as in 1990, the US Asylum Regulations proposed, namely 
that a fear of persecution upon return can be considered rea-
sonable where “the applicant can show a pattern or practice 
of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated and 
his or her own inclusion in, and identifi cation with, such a 
group of persons.”7
In the following, I shall refer to such groups of similarly 
situated persons as “groups at risk.” I argue that this notion 
is intrinsic to the Convention refugee concept. Should this 
proposition be properly factored into RSD processes, the lat-
ter would gain in transparency, consistency, effi  ciency, and, 
ultimately, fairness.
Refugee Law and Groups at Risk
Th ere is no escaping the fact that the law and practice of in-
dustrialized states has distanced itself considerably from the 
“group” approach to refugeehood, which was the norm under 
the League of Nations regime. Practically since the entry into 
force of the Refugee Convention, but more noticeably since 
the 1980s, a recurrent jurisprudential stream in Europe and 
North America has insisted that persecution necessarily 
implies a singling out of the individual, even where entire 
segments of the population of the country of origin are sub-
jected to severe discrimination or targeted for ill-treatment.8 
Some jurisdictions, notably the Dutch Council of State, have 
upheld this position relentlessly until this day. While others 
have ostensibly banned the “singling-out” requirement, they 
may still keep a cautious distance from group-based deter-
mination. To be sure, eligibility guidelines routinely stress 
that each asylum case has to be decided on its singular merits. 
An adjudicator may read into this commonsense instruction 
an encouragement to look for distinguishing features that 
are in a way unique to the claimant before him or her. Such 
a “highly individualistic” approach is misguided and should 
be questioned as a matter of principle. For the time being, 
though, I will only argue that it is not antithetic to the “group 
at risk” approach, which I am propounding. Rather, it adds 
an “individualized” requirement on top of a group-based de-
termination [“you, the individual claimant, must convince 
me that you are personally more at risk of persecution than 
all other members of a group, which is itself the target of per-
secution in your country”]—and this begs the obvious ques-
tion of who is expected to establish that the group is being 
persecuted, or discriminated against, in the fi rst place.
While admitting the lack of hard empirical data on this 
point, I contend that the way interviewers and adjudicators 
approach asylum claims is more oft en than not coloured by 
these offi  cials’ outlooks on particular groups. In a similar 
vein, Towle and Stainsby warn that historical, cultural, pol-
itical, and other biases for, or against, certain caseloads or 
nationalities of asylum seekers may lead to predetermined 
eligibility outcomes and cause disparities in recognition rates 
among national jurisdictions.9 Th is fi nding should not scare 
us, at least so far as positive inclinations are concerned. Aft er 
all, the image of a refugee among the public at large, in any 
society in which the concept is current, is likely to take the 
form, not of an isolated individual, but of a “typical” refugee 
population: the boat people from Vietnam, the Bosniaks, the 
Afghans, the Iraqis, the people of Darfur … Th e offi  cial who 
hears refugee status claims will inevitably be infl uenced by 
these public perceptions of particular situations (which, ad-
mittedly, are not always specifi c as to groups at risk within the 
larger population) as “refugee” situations. Unlike the man on 
the street, though, this offi  cial will normally have the bene-
fi t of detailed country-of-origin information, in addition to 
personal knowledge developed through previous interviews. 
Country-of-origin information is seldom neutral, and never 
perfectly objective. Nonetheless, it displaces the centre of 
subjective gravity from the individual interviewer or adjudi-
cator to a more general level, from where it can infl uence a 
large number of decisions, hence increasing consistency of 
decision making on similarly situated claims.
For their own peculiar reasons, though, states tend to con-
ceal even their positive biases towards particular groups of 
asylum seekers behind the smokescreen of a person-centered 
assessment, within which persecution is (in my view, wrong-
ly) construed as an individual experience in both its eff ect 
and its causation. Th is is not to say that groups at risk are 
completely absent from the assessment, but rather that either 
their conceptual infl uence is implicit, rather than explicit; or 
they are explicitly removed from the ambit of the Refugee 
Convention and consigned to discretionary forms of protec-
tion.
Be that as it may, industrialized states have experimented 
with a wide variety of measures acknowledging, to varying 
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degrees, the relevance of group membership to a determina-
tion of a “need for international protection” writ large. States 
in the developing world, especially in Africa, have evolved 
their own group determination mechanisms, with an eye 
on mass infl uxes. A full inventory of all explicit and implicit 
acknowledgements of the “group at risk” dimension in state 
practice worldwide is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. 
I will rely instead on a few examples, in order to illustrate the 
following point: the group-at-risk methodology off ers inter-
esting evidentiary shortcuts in refugee status determination, 
thereby reducing the complexity and opacity of procedures 
and lightening the burden of proof for the applicant.
A preliminary observation is in order: a lighter burden 
on the asylum seeker is not the necessary consequence of all 
evidentiary shortcuts. Ironically, the only “legal” presump-
tion aff ecting material RSD in the current law of industrial-
ized states is a negative one—namely, the designation of “safe 
countries of origin.” On its face, the safe country of origin no-
tion (as codifi ed in the EC directive on asylum procedures10) 
does not trigger a presumption of substance. Th e automatic 
labelling of the claim as “manifestly unfounded” in view of 
the claimant’s nationality does not entail an equally auto-
matic denial of the claim, but rather an acceleration of the 
qualifi cation procedure.11 In practice, though, accelerated 
procedures are so devoid of basic guarantees of fairness that 
their only possible outcome is a negative decision—unless, 
that is, the applicant is able to establish that there exist excep-
tional circumstances making the country of origin “unsafe” 
for him or her personally.
We can all agree—including, I am sure, the draft ers of this 
clause—that this evidential burden is simply impossible to 
meet. I certainly do not know how to make the safe coun-
try notion work as a fair mechanism. However, I can fi nd 
some comfort in a reading ab absurdo of this practically 
non-rebuttable presumption. Here is how it goes: where the 
country of origin is considered generally safe, the claimant 
must prove the existence of highly personal circumstances 
that make him or her, individually, a potential target of per-
secution. In good logic, where the country of origin is not 
regarded as generally safe, i.e., where it is acknowledged that 
persecution may happen there, the claimant should not be 
required to relate his or her fear of persecution to individual 
circumstances or “special distinguishing features” over and 
above those of groups at risk of persecution. As I explained 
before, this is also what the plain language of the Convention 
defi nition suggests.
Two Basic Questions
We can now return to the mainstream of our discussion. 
Henrik Zahle has usefully observed12 that determination of 
refugee status consists in answering two main questions:
the question of “group-risk existence” (• e.g., are 
Ahmadis persecuted in Pakistan, and if so what risk 
does an Ahmadi living in Pakistan run of actually 
being persecuted?); and
the question of “group-risk affi  liation” (• e.g., is 
the person, or are the persons, in front of me [a] 
Pakistani national[s] and does she/ do they profess 
the Ahmadi faith?). To be complete, however, one 
should add to the question of group-risk affi  liation 
that of identifi cation with the risk group, as set out in 
the above mentioned 1990 US Asylum Regulations.
I propose that we examine these two concepts in turn.
Th e question of “risk-group existence” can be broken 
down into a set of interrogations: Who determines the exist-
ence of a group at risk? Th rough which process? In what 
terms is it defi ned?
Who Determines, and Th rough Which Process?
It is possible to identify seven levels at which the existence of 
a prima facie refugee group can be established:
A. In a multilateral agreement. Th is was standard pro-
cedure in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, when under the 
auspices of the League of Nations a series of treaties and ar-
rangements were concluded with regard to specifi c categor-
ies of refugees, usually defi ned by reference to their national-
ity, coupled with lack of protection from the state of origin.13 
As noted above, the contemporary refugee regime has de-
parted from this selective and highly predictable approach 
to refugee protection. Nonetheless, the notion that ad hoc 
multilateral arrangements may be an eff ective way of resolv-
ing specifi c refugee situations is not entirely absent from the 
regime: though not binding in the same way as their League 
of Nations precursors, multilateral arrangements concern-
ing particular caseloads of asylum seekers have resurfaced 
in recent times, in the form of comprehensive plans of ac-
tion [CPA].14 It must be noted, however, that such plans do 
not necessarily formulate blanket assumptions about the 
refugee character of individuals in the group: to be sure, the 
landmark CPA adopted by the second international confer-
ence on Indo-Chinese refugees in 1989 prescribed, as part 
of a comprehensive set of humanitarian undertakings, a sys-
tematic screening, against Refugee Convention criteria, of all 
asylum seekers having left  Vietnam aft er a set cut-off  date.15
B. By UNHCR. Th e UN refugee agency is oft en called 
upon to make broad-brush assessments of the eligibility, 
under its mandate from the UN General Assembly, of large 
groups of asylum seekers in need of immediate protection 
and assistance. Whether and to what extent such assessments 
translate into states’ obligations varies from one situation to 
another, as Jackson has thoroughly documented.16 It is worth 
recalling, however, that UNHCR is also deeply—though 
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oft en grudgingly—involved in individual refugee status de-
termination, either as an add-on to, or more problematically 
as a substitute for, state-run processes. Furthermore, sev-
eral industrialized states, while they run their own asylum 
procedures, attach much credit to UNHCR’s “reading” of 
particular refugee-producing situations, on the ground that 
UNHCR’s extensive fi eld presence places its staff  in a priv-
ileged position with regard to gathering and assessing fi rst-
hand information on events in source countries. While this 
is a correct assumption, it is also true that UNHCR faces ser-
ious limitations when it comes to releasing—as opposed to 
just compiling—information on groups at risk in countries 
of origin. More than any individual state, UNHCR must be 
wary of adverse reactions, including damaging accusations 
of bias, by states of origin and/or their political friends—or, 
conversely, their political enemies if UNHCR appears to be 
“soft ” on certain source countries. Such accusations are all 
the likelier to be forthcoming, since the organization does 
not have the necessary resources to ensure a “universal” 
coverage of all refugee-producing situations, nor to update 
its information base with suffi  cient regularity. Due to those 
signifi cant limitations, UNHCR’s eligibility guidance on 
groups at risk remains incomplete in two ways: (i) it deals 
with a small number of source countries, including many 
but certainly not all quantitatively major ones; (ii) it usually 
stops short of recommending a prima facie fi nding of refu-
geehood on the basis of risk-group affi  liation/ identifi cation 
alone. Th is at times leads to rather ambiguous formulations. 
Th us, UNHCR’s eligibility guidelines on Afghan asylum 
seekers, dated 31 December 2007, go into a detailed “profi l-
ing” of groups and categories of Afghan nationals facing a 
heightened risk of being persecuted—only to conclude that 
“UNHCR considers the above-mentioned categories to be 
linked to the grounds enumerated in the refugee defi nition, 
and where such claimants are able to establish a well-founded 
fear of persecution, international protection is merited.”17 It is 
not at all clear, be it from this sentence or from the rest of the 
guidelines, what—besides their belonging in a group desig-
nated as “at risk”—may make the fear of the profi led asylum 
seekers well-founded.
C. By the EU Council. Th is is a very specifi c feature of the 
European asylum regime, and arguably a rather theoretical 
scenario. Nonetheless, the mechanism instituted by the 2001 
Temporary Protection directive,18 following almost a decade 
of experimentation with the “temporary protection” con-
cept in Europe, is worth a mention in this discussion, both 
for what it does and for what it does not do. On the posi-
tive side, the directive contains a defi nition of “benefi ciaries” 
that includes persons fl eeing persecution en masse, i.e., it 
recognizes that people fl eeing areas of endemic violence or 
armed confl ict may well fall within the scope of Article 1A of 
the Refugee Convention.19 On the down side, the decision-
making process itself is particularly cumbersome, consid-
ering that it is meant to respond to an emergency situation.20 
More critically still, the interim protection system that the 
directive envisages falls short of prima facie recognition of 
refugee status. Rather, it leaves the question of refugeehood, 
and also of eligibility for subsidiary protection, in suspense 
for the duration of the temporary protection “regime.” What 
happens (short of return) at the end of that road is rather 
confusing, since a bizarre hiatus persists between the 2001 
defi nition of “benefi ciaries of temporary protection” and that 
of persons eligible for international protection under the 
2004 Qualifi cation Directive.21
D. Executive Designation Authorized by Law. Th is is the 
most common modality of group determination, both with-
in and outside a mass infl ux scenario. Here are three illustra-
tions, out of a potentially large number of similar examples.22 
Tanzania’s Refugees Act of 1998 provides that the Minister of 
Home Aff airs may, by notice published in the Gazette, de-
clare any group of persons to be refugees for the purpose 
of that Act. Ministerial declarations or orders, based on a 
similar provision in the now-repealed Refugees Control Act 
of 1966, have been issued in Tanzania on a regular basis.23 
Still within a context of large-scale infl ux, but without refer-
ence to “refugee” status as such, one can mention Austria’s 
Aliens Residence Act of 1993, which allowed the Federal 
Government to grant, by decree, a temporary residence 
status to people fl eeing their country of origin “during times 
of heightened international tension, armed confl ict or other 
circumstances that endanger the safety of entire population 
groups.”24 Before the ink got dry on this new Act, a decree 
was issued to grant temporary residence to people from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina who had arrived before July 1993. 
Th e third example is found in the law of the Netherlands, 
one of very few European states in which the government 
has retained the power to designate, under the operation of 
its asylum law, groups and categories of persons as worthy 
of special humanitarian protection. Pursuant to Article 29 
(1) (d) of the 2000 Aliens Act, an “asylum” residence per-
mit may be granted to an alien whose return to the country 
of origin would, in the Minister’s judgment, constitute par-
ticular hardship in light of the general situation there. Th e 
Ministry of Justice’s explanatory notes make it very clear 
that this power is entirely discretionary and does not refl ect 
or engage the international law obligations of the state. Th e 
reference to “an alien” notwithstanding, the operation of 
Article 29 (1) (d) is triggered by the executive designation 
of groups and categories of persons in need of protection. 
Regulations have been issued outlining the “indicators” that 
should guide the Minister in deciding whether or not a grant 
of “categorized protection”—as this mechanism is known in 
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the Netherlands—is warranted. Th ese are: (i) the nature of 
violence in the country of origin, and specifi cally the extent 
of violations of human rights and humanitarian law, the de-
gree of arbitrariness, and the intensity as well as geographical 
spread of the violence; (ii) the activities undertaken by inter-
national organizations, to the extent that these represent a 
benchmark for the position of the international community 
regarding the situation in the country of origin; and (iii) the 
policies of other EU Member States.25 Th ough, as per stan-
dard Dutch practice, the designation of a new protected cat-
egory is discussed in Parliament before it is enacted by the 
Minister of Justice, the latter has not been questioned so far 
about the respective weight she or he attaches to these three 
indicators.26
E. Internal Instructions or Recommendations. I refer here 
to more or less binding guidance provided to fi rst-instance 
adjudicators by the administrative authorities to whom they 
report, insofar as such guidance relates to groups at risk in 
specifi c source countries. By far the most elaborate practice 
in this regard is that of the UK Home Offi  ce, whose case 
workers can, and indeed must, rely on a wide array of coun-
try-specifi c Operational Guidance Notes (OGN). OGNs 
are issued from time to time, and regularly updated, by the 
Asylum Policy Unit of the Home Offi  ce, in respect of major 
source countries of asylum claims in the UK; fi ft y-two OGNs 
are currently available on the Home Offi  ce’s website. An 
OGN typically covers issues of both fact and law, its objective 
being to facilitate and harmonize the application of refugee 
(or subsidiary protection) criteria to particular situations. 
OGNs follow a standard format, whereby an overall country 
assessment leads to a listing and analysis of “main categor-
ies” or “main types” of claims, each section being wrapped 
up with some conclusions as to eligibility for refugee or other 
protected status.
F. Authoritative Guidance from Reviewing Bodies. Th e 
designation of groups at risk, as part of general country of 
origin information, is usually considered a matter of fact, 
which is not subject to judicial review by higher courts.27 On 
the other hand, where appeal tribunals or boards engage in a 
de novo assessment of all material elements of a claim, their 
fi ndings on risk-group existence are bound to have an impact 
on the future jurisprudence of fi rst-instance bodies. In the 
UK, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal has developed 
its own country guidance system “in response to concerns 
over the inconsistency of appeal outcomes arising from dif-
ferential assessments by tribunal members of the conditions 
in countries of origin producing asylum applicants.”28 In 
this modality, country guidance is not—as with the Home 
Offi  ce—a matter of issuing administrative instructions, but a 
distinctive form of tribunal litigation: it is issued through ju-
dicial decisions, typically made on a set of cases raising a sim-
ilar country issue. Robert Th omas describes three techniques 
used by the Tribunal in such cases, two of which are relevant 
to our discussion: namely, the identifi cation of “risk categor-
ies” within specifi c source countries, such as Palestinians in 
Iraq; and the identifi cation of “risk factors” which, alone or 
in combination, contribute to making return to the country 
of origin a more dangerous proposition for individual appli-
cants, even though the group they belong to (e.g., Sri Lankan 
Tamils) is not in itself a group at risk. Whether country 
guidance issued in this way should be regarded as binding, 
persuasive, or authoritative is discussed at some length in 
Th omas’s paper.29 For our purposes, it is enough to observe 
that the Home Offi  ce refers to the Tribunal’s country guid-
ance cases extensively in its own OGNs.
Albeit in a very diff erent judicial setting, the brush of 
Dutch administrative tribunals with the notion of “group 
persecution” can also be mentioned here, in particular the 
position of the Rechtseenheidskamer (law harmonization 
chamber) which, between 1994 and 2001, performed the 
role of consistency monitor among administrative tribunals 
at a time when the Council of State had no competence in 
asylum cases. In a decision of July 2000, the tribunal acknow-
ledged that group persecution may exist in some countries, 
and that in such cases the applicant who can establish mem-
bership in the group in question benefi ts from a presump-
tion of refugeehood. However, it stopped short, in the case at 
issue, of designating the Reer Hamar clan of Somalia as such 
a “persecuted group.”30
G. In the Individual Case. Th e question of risk-group 
existence is seldom raised as such in asylum hearings, which 
tend to emphasize the personal circumstances of the claim-
ant—themselves understood more as events having aff ected 
him or her personally than as characteristics which she or 
he may share with a larger group. Th e claimant is defi nitely 
not encouraged to stress the collective dimension of his or 
her fear of persecution—nor, for that matter, to present his 
or her own view of the general situation in the country of 
origin, which is supposed to be known to the adjudicator. On 
the one hand, it may be argued that to require the individual 
claimant to prove the existence of groups at risk is to place an 
unfair burden on him or her. On the other hand, I contend 
that assumptions about groups at risk—or not at risk—are 
almost always present in the mind of the interviewer and in-
evitably aff ect the course of the hearing. Th e problem for the 
claimant, obviously, is that such assumptions are implicit and 
therefore diffi  cult to relate to (where they are positive) or to 
challenge (where they are not). Th e only way out of this catch 
would seem to be for both parties to share, as it were, their re-
spective “maps of the world,”31 in other words, to disclose the 
group-based evidence that each of them is bringing into the 
assessment of the claim. Preferably, such disclosure should 
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take place before the hearing, so that the latter can focus ex-
clusively on those material elements of the claim on which 
there has been no prior agreement. Th e UK Home Offi  ce 
has recently launched a pilot project that features such a pre-
hearing conference. I cannot tell what weight is attached to 
group-based factors of risk in this process, which I have not 
(yet) been able to observe in person. However, the Home 
Offi  ce’s practice of country guidance through public domain 
OGNs, which I described above, suggests that a good part of 
the conference may actually be devoted to comparing notes 
about groups at risk. Th is methodology presents two main 
advantages: it is participatory, and it is transparent. Th ere is 
no escaping its downside, though: there will always be a fi rst 
claim made by a member of a new group at risk—and it can 
be argued that the more detailed existing country guidance 
is, the harder it will be for this “fi rst new” claim to be recog-
nized as valid. Th e objective of lightening the claimant’s bu-
rden of proof is clearly met where the group at risk, of which 
she or he is a member, appears on the adjudicator’s “map of 
the world.” If it does not, and the map in question is, in the 
words of Popovic, “unwavering,” the burden on the applicant 
may well become unbearable.
In What Terms Is the Group-at-Risk Defi ned?
At least two ingredients appear indispensable to the descrip-
tion of a group at risk in the RSD context: one is the source 
country (i.e., the nationality of members of the group, or, if 
they are stateless, the country of habitual residence); the other 
is a time frame, which can be expressed either (i) through a 
cut-off  date of departure from the country of origin or arrival 
in the host country; or (ii) by reference to “dated” events in 
the country of origin.32 It is interesting to note, however, that 
eligibility guidance directed mainly at individual determina-
tion processes, such as OGNs, UNHCR guidelines, or “coun-
try guidance cases” are not always precise as to the temporal 
validity of their risk assessments. It must be assumed that 
they represent the issuing authority’s reading of the situation 
at the time of writing, but claims entering a refugee status de-
termination procedure at that time may not be decided upon 
until months later. It seems logical to require, therefore, that 
any risk-group existence determination should be supported 
by time-specifi c country information, as well as regularly 
and systematically updated.
Beyond the (obvious) nationality element and the (not so 
obvious) time frame, the wide variety of processes through 
which groups at risk come to light in RSD is mirrored in very 
diff erent levels of detail in the representation of such groups. 
Formulations will also vary according to the signifi cance 
given to the risk-group notion in the overall assessment of 
the claim. Here, it is worth recalling that not all instruments 
referred to in the previous section identify groups at risk as 
such—they may, e.g., refer to types of claims, which is an ob-
viously more open as well as more neutral description. Save 
in situations of large-scale infl ux, membership in the group is 
rarely conclusive evidence of a need for international protec-
tion: more oft en, it is only indicative of the direction, which 
an inquiry into the personal circumstances of the claimant 
ought to take.
Th us, while an OGN designates former members of par-
ties to the confl ict in Colombia as a risk-group, it considers 
a grant of asylum appropriate only where the claimant estab-
lishes that he or she has been “kidnapped in the past and/or 
[has] encountered serious harassment or threats from either 
FARC, ELN or AUC, and such treatment has been for polit-
ical reasons.”33 Th is last requirement, in particular, appears 
dangerously circular: if it cannot even be assumed that the 
harassment of ex-members of armed groups is politically mo-
tivated, the very notion of risk group loses all relevance in this 
context. To be relevant, the notion must be susceptible of use 
as a “reading grid,” a lens through which the refugee defi nition 
is projected against the background of country-of-origin in-
formation. A straightforward illustration can be found in an-
other OGN, in respect of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
which concludes its analysis of the situation of Banyamulenge 
Tutsis in that country with the following statement: “If it is 
accepted that the claimant is of Banyamulenge origin, a grant 
of asylum is likely to be appropriate.”34
Tutsis from the Democratic Republic of Congo also bene-
fi t, on account of their sole ethnicity, from “categorized pro-
tection” in the Netherlands. In contrast, the protected cat-
egory of Sudanese from Darfur is defi ned by a mix of innate 
characteristics, place of origin, itinerary, and other elements 
of personal history: non-Arabs from North, West, or South 
Darfur are eligible unless they resided without diffi  culties for 
a period of six months or more in the north of the coun-
try. Th e notion of internal relocation alternative thus creeps 
into the defi nition of a group at risk, which, as noted by the 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development in a 
2006 study, is a bit of a paradox.35 I will briefl y revert to this 
point further down.
I have already alluded to the way groups with a prima 
facie need for protection are identifi ed where they arrive 
in large numbers over a short period of time. In most such 
cases, what states attempt to defi ne through the adoption 
of special criteria is a fait accompli, in the sense that the 
emergency is in full swing already. One must acknowledge 
the peculiar diffi  culty of adopting precise defi nitions in the 
heat of an infl ux. Th e refugee-producing crisis may be too 
current to permit a detailed analysis of its causes, which are 
likely to be complex in any event. Neighbouring states may 
also be wary that their attitudes towards fl eeing persons do 
not aggravate international tensions, or close the door to 
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quiet diplomacy for the resolution of the crisis. Receiving 
states and UNHCR may be tempted, therefore, to resort to 
broad-brush characterizations. Th e judgmental “massive 
violations of human rights” and the more neutral “events 
seriously disturbing public order” become handy catch-
phrases, erasing important distinctions among groups at 
risk and among the types of risk they actually incur. Such 
distinctions are important, not only in order to calibrate 
the protection response, but also in order to identify the 
appropriate durable solutions.36 Even where they are faced 
with large-scale infl uxes, therefore, states should aim at the 
most precise description possible of their causes, including 
time and space parameters. While this is not an easy task, it 
is not an impossible one: aft er all, the circumstances lead-
ing to involuntary displacement are usually well known and 
suffi  ciently documented before they manifest themselves 
through cross-border fl ows.
Th e next set of questions concerns inclusion in, and iden-
tifi cation with, groups at risk.
What Is the Claimant’s Burden of Proof?
Designation of a group at risk undoubtedly provides an “evi-
dentiary shortcut” in the RSD process. Nevertheless, the in-
dividual member of the group is not relieved of all evidential 
burden: she or he must satisfy the authority that she or he 
belongs in, and/or is identifi ed with, the group at risk. It is, 
simply put, the degree of precision in the defi nition of the 
group that will determine the evidential burden to be dis-
charged by the individual claimant.
While in theory all persons belonging to the discriminated 
group are equally at risk, one must accept that the particular 
position of individuals within the group may be relevant, as 
it may determine the level of repression expected from the 
authority (i.e., the threshold between discrimination and 
persecution). Whether the individual’s position in the group 
may also aff ect the likelihood of persecution, i.e., the well-
foundedness of the fear, is more debatable. Th e UK Home 
Offi  ce’s guidance in respect of, e.g., Falun Gong members 
from China or Ahmadis from Pakistan holds that members 
of these groups have no persecution to fear if they lie low; in 
other words, the likelihood of persecution depends on their 
membership in the group being “visible” to the potential per-
secutor. Th is further level of discrimination is in my opinion 
not required for a correct application of the refugee defi n-
ition. To be sure, an assessment of “visibility” is highly prob-
lematic within a qualifi cation process that is, in essence, an 
“essay in prediction”:37 the “unexceptional Ahmadi”38 may 
have been discreet so far, but this is no guarantee that she or 
he will be able, let alone willing, to remain “invisible” in the 
future.
To What Standard Must the Evidential Burden Be 
Discharged?
In attempting to distinguish between the existence of a group 
at risk and the affi  liation to such a group, “the diff erence in 
focus and in the types of information asked for reasonably 
demand a distinction to be made when assessing the evi-
dence.”39
To say that a risk group exists is another way of stating 
that members of the group have a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted. Th is does not mean that it is more likely than 
not they will be: a reasonable likelihood is a more appropri-
ate standard. On the other hand, where group affi  liation is at 
issue, the standard can be raised: there must be a relatively 
high degree of certainty that the applicant is who he claims 
to be (in terms of affi  liation with a designated group).40 Th is 
point was not lost to the Dutch Ministry of Justice as it elu-
cidated the rules of evidence applicable to claims to “cat-
egorized protection”: in order to arrive at a decision on this 
 matter,
one must not in the fi rst place consider whether the asylum 
seeker’s statements regarding the substance of his or her claim 
are credible. What is primarily at issue is whether the asylum 
seeker belongs to a category that has been designated for a grant 
[of categorised protection]. It goes without saying that identity 
and nationality must be established well beyond doubt.41
Th ese are facts, indeed, that are not subject to speculation, 
but from which signifi cant inferences are about to be drawn. 
Is this to say that group-based RSD requires more certainty 
regarding identity and national origin than an individualized 
approach? If this is the case, what additional evidence is re-
quired, and in what form? And above all: what are the conse-
quences if it is not adduced to the satisfaction of the adjudi-
cator? Th ese are questions worth exploring further, against 
the challenging backdrop of wilful destruction of identity 
documents; forging, swapping, and confi scating passports; 
and other practices, for which people-smuggling rings that 
control many of the asylum seekers’ fl ight routes have be-
come notorious.
Rules of evidence fi nd their application within proced-
ures, and issues of burden and standard of proof may, in the 
fi nal analysis, be determined by the setting, within which 
evidence is being adduced by the asylum seeker, to the ef-
fect that he or she belongs in, and can be identifi ed with, 
such risk group as has been defi ned. In mass or diff use infl ux 
situations, the simple act of coming forward may constitute 
the beginning and the end of the qualifi cation process. Th us, 
in Tanzania following the 1994 ministerial declaration in fa-
vour of refugees from Burundi,42 the eligibility procedure 
was actually dispensed with through a summary process of 
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registering family units upon admission into a refugee camp, 
which served assistance at least as much as protection pur-
poses. In such situations, it appears that the main control of 
the integrity of the process is exercised by the refugee popu-
lation itself, through an informal co-optation mechanism 
that does not necessarily refl ect the criteria set by the host 
state.43 While a stricter screening exercise can be envisaged 
at a later stage, it is likely to cause major disruption in the 
aff ected settlements if it results in deregistration of a sub-
stantial number of residents. Th e few studies that have been 
undertaken on this topic44 paint a rather confused picture, 
suggesting that group determination procedures that are fair, 
credible, and effi  cient in refugee emergencies remain, by and 
large, to be invented. In this connection, an ongoing initia-
tive in the Americas probably deserves attention. In the areas 
of Ecuador bordering on Colombia, the Ecuadorian govern-
ment and UNHCR register asylum seekers originating from 
any of nine administrative departments of Colombia, on the 
understanding that they are more likely than not to meet the 
refugee defi nition criteria of the Ecuadorian law. UNHCR 
has proposed to the government to introduce an enhanced 
registration and profi ling system, which would obviate the 
need for registered Colombian asylum seekers to go through 
the regular RSD procedure.45
Rebuttable Presumption, or Not?
Th e evidentiary shortcut described in the preceding sections 
can be loosely described as the operation of a presumption: 
upon proof of a few facts, the law presumes another relevant 
fact—in essence, a well-founded fear of being persecuted. 
Some features of this evidentiary process make it diffi  cult, 
however, to assimilate fully to a rebuttable presumption of 
law, the eff ect of which is to change the allocation of the risk 
of losing regarding a particular issue.46
First, as we have seen, the “presumption” of refugeehood is 
not always established by law. Second, in RSD one can hardly 
speak of two parties with confl icting interests, both at risk 
of “losing the case”: the offi  cial representing the state does 
not have a case to lose; rather his or her job is to ensure the 
proper application of a common good, albeit that this may 
involve a refutation of the claimant’s evidence.
Th is observation leads us into a third conceptual obstacle: 
if refugeehood on a group basis stems from a presumption, 
this presumption is not stricto sensu rebuttable. Let us as-
sume that the asylum seeker has made a prima facie case of 
refugeehood; in other words, has met the burden of proof 
to the satisfaction of the “law”—i.e. the criteria set by the 
“group determiner” are not in dispute. Th e Handbook states 
that this person must be regarded as a refugee in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary. But what can such evidence con-
sist of?
Clearly, the state would be in contradiction with itself if 
it were to dispute, in an individual case doubtlessly belong-
ing to a designated group, the existence or even the risk of 
persecution in the country of origin. Under the League of 
Nations, when refugees were primarily defi ned in relation to 
their membership in a group, the fact of not enjoying na-
tional protection was also part of the defi nition. Th e cursory 
screening of individual refugees would involve, therefore, 
some inquiry into this fact, notably as regards any evidence 
that the individual had eff ectively and voluntarily main-
tained ties with the state of origin. Th is evidence, if we as-
sume that it was produced by the offi  cial as would normally 
be the case, was indeed “evidence to the contrary” because 
non-availment of national protection was an integral part of 
the defi nition. In contrast, when Hungarian refugees sought 
refuge in Germany following the 1956 revolution (and the 
Refugee Convention was deemed applicable), each applicant 
was automatically recognized and documented as a refugee 
unless she or he presented a security risk.47 While it was the 
responsibility of the state to establish the existence of such a 
risk, this was clearly not tantamount to producing “evidence 
to the contrary”: what was at issue was not the refugee char-
acter of the individual in question, but whether, as a refugee, 
the individual could safely be granted asylum or any other 
facility in Germany.
Th ough African state practice is extremely poor with re-
gard to screening “non-refugees” out of designated refugee 
groups, the attempts made by Zambia, Tanzania, and the 
DRC/Zaire all point to a similar concern for national secur-
ity.48 Th e tragic experience of the Rwandan exodus following 
the 1994 genocide brought to light the very real possibility 
that refugee fl ows might be “contaminated” by the presence 
of serious off enders, war criminals, or genocidaires. Without 
underestimating the practical diffi  culties involved, this is 
probably the clearest case, under Article1 of the Convention, 
for “rebutting” the “presumption” of refugeehood in individ-
ual cases: that is, where an exclusion clause may be invoked. 
Even in this case, however, it may be incorrect to describe 
the “contrary move” of the receiving state as a rebuttal of 
the presumption. In all legal rigour, the assessment of ex-
clusion grounds is a separate test, distinct from the assess-
ment of inclusion (which is what the so-called presumption 
is about).49
In contrast, a fi nding of “internal protection”—the avail-
ability within the country of origin of a safe relocation al-
ternative to asylum seeking abroad—is normally regarded as 
part and parcel of the inclusion process. Can the state that 
has designated a group as “at risk” dispute the existence of 
the risk in an individual case by arguing that this particu-
lar claimant availed, or could/should have availed, himself 
or herself of an internal fl ight/relocation alternative inside 
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the country of origin? Th is would indeed be “evidence to the 
contrary,” capable of rebutting the group-based presumption 
of refugeehood. To introduce this parameter into the assess-
ment seems, however, to defeat the purpose of procedural 
and evidential simplifi cation. Designations of “protected cat-
egories” in the Netherlands have attempted to square this cir-
cle by “objectivizing” internal protection, notably in the cases 
of Somalia and Sudan: instead of probing the potential of an 
hypothetical relocation to a relatively safe and stable part of 
the country, the “categorized protection” assessment includes 
the fact of prior problem-free residence in such a part, which 
in turn is interpreted as evidence of the current and future 
availability of internal protection. Th is additional criterion 
injects several layers of complexity into the evidentiary pro-
cess, and multiple shift s in the allocation of the burden of 
proof, that may well off set the positive eff ect of group-based 
RSD in terms of effi  ciency and consistency.
Tentative Conclusions
Undoubtedly, the main argument in favour of group-based 
RSD is its effi  ciency. It avoids the need for fresh decisions 
on the same material in situations of common application, 
with the associated resource implications. Th is consideration 
is clearly predominant in mass infl ux situations. As we have 
seen, though, there is in such situations a risk that effi  ciency 
may be achieved at the expense of certainty: because of an 
overly broad or vague defi nition of the groups at risk, and/
or as a result of procedural faults, the receiving state is not 
entirely confi dent about the “refugee” character of all those 
admitted as refugees; such indeterminacy may also be detri-
mental to the asylum seekers themselves where—as in the 
case of EU-styled temporary protection—they fi nd them-
selves in a legal limbo and with an inferior status. Th ere is no 
reason, however, why effi  ciency and certainty cannot be rec-
onciled, especially in those states where resources are avail-
able to be applied to the regular updating and distillation of 
country information, and to the monitoring and control of 
asylum decisions.
To admit group-based evidence in RSD is also advanta-
geous in that it is bound to increase decisional consistency. 
It can be argued that it enhances consistency in two ways: 
at one level, it ensures that like cases are treated alike; on a 
more conceptual plane, it makes RSD more consistent with 
the refugee defi nition itself.
Consistency is an element of fairness, not least because it 
breeds predictability. Where groups at risk are clearly identi-
fi ed, the claimant knows what she or he is supposed to prove 
and is aware of the inferences that will be made from his or 
her statements. Admittedly, the above benefi ts can only be 
reaped if the process is suffi  ciently transparent: any group-
based evidence must be squarely “above the table” and all 
possible inferences must be explicit. I set out on this inquiry 
with a particular understanding of a “lighter” burden of 
proof, whereby the claimant is required either to prove fewer 
facts in issue, or to produce evidence to which the claimant 
has easier access. However, issues surrounding suffi  ciency of, 
and access to, evidence can hardly be resolved in the abstract: 
whereas risk-group affi  liation may be easier to prove in some 
situations, this will not be the case in others. In the fi nal an-
alysis, therefore, I fi nd that fairness will be better served by a 
transparent and precise defi nition of groups at risk than by a 
sheer reduction of defi nitional criteria.
Th ere is, on the other hand, a distinct risk of artifi cial-
ity in any attempt at classifi cation or categorization, which 
is somehow inherent in group-based RSD. Th omas rightly 
warns: “Country guidance prioritizes certainty and con-
sistency over individual justice. In particular, country guide-
line determinations, it has been argued, seek to impose 
artifi cial certainty on what are oft en uncertain and rapidly 
changing country situations.”50 In a similar vein, Legomsky 
identifi es complexity and dynamism as essential ingredients 
of the subject matter with which asylum adjudicators must 
contend.51 Not only is categorization somewhat artifi cial, it 
is also, inevitably, selective: as noted above, fairness will be 
trumped if the asylum seeker is faced with an unwavering 
“map of the world,” on which the group to which she or he 
belongs does not fi gure.
I am not recommending, in any case, that group-based 
RSD should be the exclusive, or even the preferred, approach 
to applying the refugee defi nition. It is neither feasible nor de-
sirable to reduce RSD to a process of fi tting individual appli-
cants into neatly defi ned categories. While refugee defi nition 
criteria are not “highly individualistic,” they are not “highly 
collective” either. In particular, there will always be situa-
tions in which group-based discriminatory measures (and/
or measures of general application) do not meet the thresh-
old of persecution, except for those individuals who do act-
ively resist them. Th e assessment required in such deserving 
cases cannot be exhausted by the two recommended steps of 
risk-group existence and risk-group affi  liation. On the other 
hand, it does not make those steps redundant either. What 
is recommended, in short, is a balanced approach, one that 
avoids both the temptation of excessive emphasis on individ-
ual circumstances and the dangers of exclusive reliance on 
group characteristics.
Individual and group determination processes are rarely 
discussed together, or, if they are, it is mainly with a view 
to stressing their allegedly irreconcilable diff erences. In the 
global North, not only does the Handbook’s mantra accord-
ing to which refugee status “must normally be determined 
on an individual basis” hold its ground, it has actually been 
taken to such undesirable extremes as the “singling out” re-
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quirement. It has also failed to produce consistent or cred-
ible outcomes.52 At the other extreme, there seems to be a 
consensus that large-scale infl uxes—to which some sort of 
group determination is the typical response—follow their 
own rules, which in turn are deemed to be less rigorous and 
somehow less worthy of legal analysis than individual RSD. 
Were it not for the formalization of temporary protection in 
Europe, which is a very recent phenomenon, one might even 
suspect that group determination is perceived in the indus-
trialized world as a symptom of underdevelopment, an in-
complete mechanism to which developing countries resort 
by default, for want of a better way.
Regrettably, neither UNHCR nor African states have made 
much eff ort to dispel this negative perception of their group 
determination practices. Th e recommendation of the 1979 
Pan-African Conference on Refugees, calling for a thorough 
study of these practices, remains a dead letter, despite being 
reiterated on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the 1969 
OAU Convention.53 Th e lack of systematic compilation and 
comparative analysis undoubtedly reinforces the feeling that 
not much can be learned from ad hoc mechanisms and dis-
parate pieces of legislation, and relegates group determina-
tion to insignifi cance. True, there are serious conceptual and 
procedural weaknesses in African refugee law as it applies to 
groups of refugees. In my view, though, it would be a mis-
take to throw the baby away with the bathwater and to simply 
dismiss African practice of group-based RSD. Th ere are two 
important reasons for this.
Firstly, there has been in recent years a steady push for 
African states that have not yet equipped themselves with 
“regular” (i.e., individual) RSD procedures, or whose existing 
procedures have somehow gone out of use, to overcome 
those defi ciencies. Some real progress has been achieved in 
this direction, including the accompanying development of 
legal counselling services for asylum seekers and the surge of 
capacity-building projects benefi ting national RSD author-
ities.54 While this trend is welcome, it is not exempt from risk: 
African states will no doubt be tempted to adopt the restrict-
ive practices of their European partners, the export value of 
which has already been tested in Europe’s “near abroad” in a 
way that has not, by any yardstick, enhanced the protection 
available to genuine asylum seekers. As they engage in regu-
lating and/or revamping individual RSD procedures, African 
states with a past or current practice of group determination 
should be encouraged not to discard this practice, but rather 
to factor it into a comprehensive approach to refugee protec-
tion on their territories. Such a “comprehensive” approach—
this is my second and fi nal point—does not only mean co-
existence of individual and group determination processes 
within domestic jurisdictions, though this would in any 
event be useful, particularly in states likely to face large-scale 
infl uxes from time to time due to their geostrategic location. 
It also means the interpenetration of critical elements of both 
individual and group-based processes. As I hope this article 
has made clear, the value of such an exercise would extend 
far beyond the confi nes of Africa.
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